Introduction (anti-scientism)

It may seem odd for a STEM professor to write in opposition to “scientism” – wouldn’t an extremely high regard for science be seen as a good thing by someone actually in the field? Honestly, if “scientism” were truly a high regard for science, I wouldn’t be so troubled by it – it is, instead, a near-worship of a warped caricature of science. It’s enormously detrimental for public policy, and potentially devastating for the actual practice of science, not to mention its effect on civil discourse.

A few key observations about science before we move on to introducing the essays themselves:

  • I often hear the phrase, “I believe in science.” I’m never sure quite what that means – with regard to the natural world, I believe in evidence, and science is the best known method for accumulating evidence of high (and known) quality.
  • About any particular “fact” in science, the only thing that can be known for certain is that, someday, it will be known to be incorrect or at least incomplete*. That is, as we continue to refine our knowledge, we will realize that our previous knowledge, while perhaps useful as an approximation at a certain scale of operation and with an appropriate level of uncertainty, can be noticeably improved.
  • This does not mean that the previous (incorrect or incomplete) fact will not continue to be useful – Newtonian mechanics is still incredibly useful at the scale of everyday engineering, even though it’s far from satisfactory at the scale of either galaxies or atomic nuclei, or at near-light speeds.
  • For maximum utility, a scientific “fact” must also include an estimate of the uncertainty associated to that fact – either an actual confidence interval associated with a measurement, or some other measure of evidentiary quality (some idea of what sources of confounding have been ruled out, and to what extent, and which ones have not).
  • Opinions (going beyond the current actual body of knowledge) of expert practitioners in a field are not themselves scientific facts. They may be useful, but principally for other (perhaps less expert) practitioners to choose areas of research. I note that this may come in two forms – experiments to perhaps confirm expert opinion (and thereby curry favor with the experts), and experiments to perhaps contradict expert opinions (surprise is one of the key drivers in scientific progress).
  • Philosophical and political beliefs of expert practitioners in a scientific field are principally useful as subjects for sociological or psychological research. They have no bearing on the quality of the scientific evidence produced by them (or by others with whom they may disagree philosophically or politically).
  • New, immature scientific disciplines often get a LOT wrong in the early days. Assessment of uncertainty in these disciplines must take that into account.

Now, as to what I mean by “scientism” – it is an overly high regard for and certainty about “scientific facts” based on their origin in science (or even simply their pronouncement by scientists), without regard to the actual associated uncertainties. Since science is necessarily somewhat equivocal about most of its “facts” (that is, there are often mildly contradictory studies and experiments, with varying degrees of uncertainty), certainty about “scientific facts” necessarily involves the use of the “file drawer” (in which some results are either not published, or not publicized in order to bolster the apparent certainty of other results).

Characteristics of “scientism” at this point in history:

  • Statements are made with certainty instead of confidence (that is, the uncertainties are deleted, or hidden from view).
  • There is an over-reliance on mathematical models (at least those supporting particular narratives) without appropriate assessment of the uncertainty of those models.
  • Science is overly politicized – views contradictory to the “ruling class” narrative are suppressed (as is the work of those who are known to have these views). This is particularly true in the area of government research grants.
  • Philosophical materialism is adduced as necessary for scientific progress, and contradictory views are suppressed (as is the work of those who are known to have these views).

For whatever reason, this seems mostly to be a failing of the political left.** Perhaps this is because “scientism” mostly benefits the ruling class which, at the moment, is largely captured by the political left.

In the essays that follow, I will principally take specific topics in popular scientific discourse/policy and relate them to these characteristics. The one exception is “philosophical materialism” which will have its own essay. I will begin, though, with a general discussion of evidentiary quality in science.


* Note that this (uniquely) does not apply to pure mathematics. Which is why, objectively speaking, we rock!

** See here for what I mean by “left” politically.